On bridging philosophy and sociology of sience. Reply to Jesús Zamora Bonilla by Kuipers, Theo A.F.
  
 University of Groningen
On bridging philosophy and sociology of sience. Reply to Jesús Zamora Bonilla
Kuipers, Theo A.F.
Published in:
EPRINTS-BOOK-TITLE
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Kuipers, T. A. F. (2005). On bridging philosophy and sociology of sience. Reply to Jesús Zamora Bonilla. In
EPRINTS-BOOK-TITLE University of Groningen.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
In: R. Festa, A. Aliseda and J. Peijnenburg (eds.), Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth 
Approximation (PoznaĔ Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 83),  
pp. 370-372. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 2005. 
Theo A. F. Kuipers
ON BRIDGING PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
REPLY TO JESÚS ZAMORA BONILLA 
There is a difficult relationship between present-day sociologists of science 
and social epistemologists, on the one hand, and “neo-classical” philosophers 
of science, on the other. Both parties have difficulty in taking each other 
seriously. Hope should be derived from those scholars who seriously try to 
build bridges. Of course, bridge builders have to start from somewhere and the 
most promising constructors with a philosophy of science background are in 
my view Alvin Goldman (1999), Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999), and, last but not 
least, Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2000). In the latter’s contribution to this volume 
Zamora Bonilla continues his very specific project of clearly specifying a kind 
of research agenda for studying bridge issues, in critical response to Ilkka 
Kieseppä’s reservations about a methodological role of the theory of 
verisimilitude and David Resnik’s arguments against the explanation of 
scientific method by appeal to scientific aims. Some of his main points are the 
following. (1) Gaining “recognition” is the dominant personal motivation of 
scientists, followed by trying to serve epistemic values. (2) Epistemic values 
can be served by methodological norms. (3) The norms have to be chosen 
under a “veil of ignorance” regarding the fate of the theories that will be 
proposed by certain scientists and hence the recognition they will get from 
them. (4) Hence, the most common norms in practice will best serve the 
relevant epistemic values. (5) Conversely, an adequate epistemic theory should 
enable us to justify these norms. (6) The HD method is very popular among 
scientists and is favorable for truth approximation, at least when both are 
explicated along the lines of ICR or along related lines, as presented by 
Zamora Bonilla. (7) The theory of truth approximation even justifies the 
popularity of the HD method. 
Zamora Bonilla concludes with: 
One possible challenge for those epistemologists who defend other kinds of cognitive 
utilities would be to justify that these other preferences just as well explain as the theory 
of verisimilitude the methodological norms actually adopted by scientists. Sociologists of 
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science should also try to offer alternative explanations of the extreme popularity of the 
hypothetico-deductive method (p. 366). 
I would like to accept the first challenge and make the second somewhat more 
precise. Before doing so, though, I quote a statement from SiS (pp. 349-50).
To be sure, scientists not only aim at cognitive goals like empirical success or even the 
truth of their theories, but they also have social aims like recognition and power, and 
hence means to reach such aims. And although these goals frequently strengthen each 
other, [the existence of] such convergences by no means implies that the conscious 
pursuit of these social goals is good for science. 
By arguing that epistemic values are subordinate to recognition and 
methodological norms subordinate to epistemic values, the latter on the basis 
of a veil of ignorance regarding the ultimately resultant recognition, Zamora 
Bonilla greatly relativized the possible negative effects of the conscious 
pursuit of recognition for the pursuit of epistemic values such as empirical 
success and truth. 
To What Extent Are Instrumentalist Epistemic Values Sufficient? 
A dominant line of argumentation in ICR is that the instrumentalist 
methodology, that is, HD evaluation of theories, is functional for truth 
approximation. Hence, that methodology serves the sophisticated realist 
cognitive values, and hence, conversely, these values can explain and justify 
the popularity of this methodology, to whit comparative HD evaluation. So far 
I agree with Zamora Bonilla. However, I would also claim that this 
methodology serves instrumentalist epistemic values, notably empirical 
success, at least as well. At first sight, Zamora Bonilla seems to disagree, but 
this might be mere appearance. The reason is that his own explication of truth 
approximation (see Zamora Bonilla 2000, and references therein) is essentially 
of an epistemic nature. Like Niiniluoto’s (1987) notion of “estimated 
truthlikeness,” it is not an objective notion. However, unlike Niiniluoto’s 
notion, that of Zamora Bonilla is not based on an objective one. On the other 
hand, like my objective explication, and in contrast to Niiniluoto’s explication, 
Bonilla’s explication straightforwardly supports HD evaluation. Hence, the 
question is whether Bonilla’s explication goes further than instrumentalist 
epistemic purposes. If so, my claim would be that even his explication is more 
than strictly necessary for explaining and justifying HD evaluation. However, 
this is not the occasion to investigate this in detail.
For the moment the interesting question remains whether there are other 
reasons to favor the (constructive) realist epistemology relative to the 
instrumentalist one. In ICR I have given two such reasons, one of a long-term 
and one of a short-term nature. Only the realist can make sense of the long-
term dynamics in science, practiced by instrumentalists and realists, in which 
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theoretical terms become observation terms, viz., by accepting the relevant 
theories as the (strongest relevant) truth. This general outlook enables the 
realist to relativize for the short term a counterexample to a new theory that is 
an observational success of a competing theory by pointing out the possibility 
that the latter may be accidental (ICR, p. 237, p. 318) or, to use my favorite 
new term, that it may be “a lucky hit.” In sum, although both epistemologies 
can explain and justify the popularity of the instrumentalist method, only the 
realist can make sense of the regular occurrence of long-term extensions of the 
observational language and the occasional short-term phenomenon of 
downplaying successes of old theories. 
The Proper Challenge to Sociologists Regarding Non-Falsificationist 
Behavior
None of this alters the fact that the suggested explanations-cum-justifications 
of HD evaluation provide an invitation to sociologists of science to offer 
alternative explanations of the popularity of HD evaluation. To be more 
precise, sociologists of science have shown convincingly that scientists 
frequently demonstrate non-falsificationist behavior. However, they have been 
inclined to look for “social” explanations for that type of behavior, whereas in 
the view of Zamora Bonilla and myself, straightforward cognitive explanations 
can be given. Certainly the most important reason is the relativization of the 
cognitive role of falsification in the process of (even purely observational) 
truth approximation. This amounts to the difference between HD testing and 
HD evaluation of theories. Moreover, both methods leave room for many 
sensible ways in which a prima facie counterexample of a favorite theory can 
be questioned as such. For both claims, see ICR, Section 5.2.3, or SiS, Section 
7.3.3. Finally, there is the possibility of the lucky hit nature of successes of a 
competing theory, referred to above. Hence, in all these cases there are 
cognitive reasons to expect that non-falsificationist behavior may serve 
epistemic purposes. To be sure, and this is a major point made by Zamora 
Bonilla, on average this may well be useful for gaining recognition. Hence, in 
regard to non-falsificationist behavior, the proper challenge to sociologists is to 
look for cases that cannot be explained in this convergent way. 
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